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Accused (by counsel only,

/.

if

represented)

may

address the Tribunal.
g.

h.

The prosecution may address the Tribunal.
The Tribunal will deliver judgment and pro-

nounce sentence.
SECTION

V.

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

—

Article 16. Penalty. The Tribunal shall have
the power to impose upon an accused, on conviction,
death, or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just.
Article 17. Judgment and review. The judgment
will be announced in open court and will give the
reasons on which it is based. The record of the trial
will be transmitted directly to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for his action. Sen-

—

tence will be carried out in accordance with the

Order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, who may at any time reduce or otherwise
alter the sentence, except

By command

of General

Richard
Major

to increase

J.

its

severity.

MacArthur:
Marshall

General, General Staff Corps,

Chief of Staff.
(26)

In re Yamashita

(Supreme Court of the United States, 4 February 1946 (327 U.

Mr. Chief Justice Stone

S. 1))

delivered the opinion

of the Court.

an application for leave to
file^a petition for writs of habeas corpus and prohibiNo. 672 is a petition for certiorari
tion in this Court.
to review an order of the Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines (28 U. S. C. § 349),

No. 61 Miscellaneous

is

denying petitioner's application to that court for
writs of habeas corpus and prohibition. As both
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applications raise substantially like questions, and

because of the importance and novelty of some of
those presented,

we

set the

two applications down

one case.
From the petitions and supporting papers it appears that prior to September 3, 1945, petitioner was
the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army
Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands. On that date he surrendered to and
became a prisoner of war of the United States Army
Forces in Baguio, Philippine Islands. On September
25th, by order of respondent, Lieutenant General
Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the
United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, which
command embraces the Philippine Islands, petitioner
was served with a charge prepared by the Judge
Advocate General's Department of the Army, purporting to charge petitioner with a violation of the
law of war. On October 8, 1945, petitioner, after
pleading not guilty to the charge, was held for trial
before a military commission of five Army officers
appointed by order of General Styer. The order
appointed six Army officers, all lawyers, as defense
Throughout the proceedings which folcounsel.

for oral

argument

as

lowed, including those before this Court, defense
counsel have demonstrated their professional

skill

and resourcefulness and their proper zeal for the
defense with which they were charged.
On the same date a bill of particulars was filed by
the prosecution, and the commission heard a motion
made in petitioner's behalf to dismiss the charge on
the ground that it failed to state a violation of the
law of war. On October 29th the commission was
reconvened, a supplemental bill of particulars was
filed, and the motion to dismiss was denied.
The
trial then proceeded until its conclusion on December
7, 1945, the commission hearing two hundred and

328
eighty-six witnesses,

who gave over

three thousand

pages of testimony. On that date petitioner was
found guilty of the offense as charged and sentenced
to death by hanging.

The

petitions for habeas corpus set

up that the

detention of petitioner for the purpose of the

trial

was unlawful for reasons which are now urged as
showing that the military commission was without
lawful authority or jurisdiction to place petitioner on
trial,

as follows:

That the military commission which tried and
convicted petitioner was not lawfully created, and
{a)

that no military commission to try petitioner for
violations of the law of

war could lawfully be con-

vened after the cessation of hostilities between the
armed forces of the United States and Japan;

That the charge preferred against petitioner
fails to charge him with a violation of the law of war;
(c) That the commission was without authority
(b)

and jurisdiction to try and convict petitioner because
the order governing the procedure of the commission
permitted the admission in evidence of depositions,
affidavits and hearsay and opinion evidence, and because the commission's rulings admitting such evidence were in violation of the 25th and 38th Articles

War

(10 U. S. C. §§ 1496, 1509) and the Geneva
Convention (47 Stat. 2021), and deprived petitioner

of

of a fair trial in violation of the

the Fifth
(d)

due process clause of

Amendment;

That the commission was without authority

and jurisdiction in the premises because of the failure
to give advance notice of petitioner's trial to the
neutral power representing the interests of Japan as
a belligerent as required

by

Article 60*of the

Geneva

Convention, 47 Stat. 2021, 2051.
On the same grounds the petitions for writs of
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prohibition set

up that the commission

authority to proceed with the

The Supreme Court

is

without

trial.

of the Philippine Islands, after

hearing argument, denied the petition for habeas
corpus presented to it, on the ground, among others,
that

jurisdiction

its

was limited to an inquiry

as to

the jurisdiction of the commission to place petitioner

on

the offense charged, and that the commis-

trial for

being validly constituted by the order of General
Styer, had jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
sion,

and over the
In

Ex

trial for

the offense charged.

parte Quirin, 317 U. S.

1,

we had

occasion to

consider at length the sources and nature of the

authority to create military commissions for the
of

enemy combatants

We

war.

§

CI.

8,

*

punish

law of

there pointed out that Congress, in the

exercise of the
I,

for offenses against the

trial

power conferred upon

by

Article

10 of the Constitution to "define and
*

Offences against the Law of Na*" of which the law of war is a part, had
*

tions

*

by the

Articles of

*

it

War

(10 U. S. C. §§ 1471-1593)

recognized the "military commission" appointed
military

command,

United States

as

Army

tribunal for the trial

against the law of war.

by

had previously existed in
practice, as an appropriate
and punishment of offenses
it

Article IS declares that the

"provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction

upon courts martial

not be construed as de* or other mili*
priving military commissions *
tary tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of
offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war
may be triable by such military commissions * * *
or other military tribunals." See a similar provision
of the Espionage Act of 1917, SO U. S. C. § 38.
Article 2 includes among those persons subject to the
Articles of War the personnel of our own military
establishment. But this, as Article 12 indicates, does
shall
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not exclude from the class of persons subject to trial
by military commissions "any other person who by
the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals," and who, under Article 12, may be tried by
court-martial, or under Article IS by military
commission.
We further pointed out that Congress, by sanction-

enemy combatants for violations of the
law of war by military commissions, had not attempted
to codify the law of war or to mark its precise
Instead, by Article IS it had incorboundaries.
porated, by reference, as within the preexisting
jurisdiction of military commissions created by
appropriate military command, all offenses which are
defined as such by the law of war, and which may
ing trial of

constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction.
It thus

adopted the system of military

common law

by military tribunals so far as it should be
recognized and deemed applicable by the courts, and
as further defined and supplemented by the Hague
applied

Convention, to which the United States and the Axis
powers were parties.
We also emphasized in Ex parte Quirin, as we do
here, that on application for habeas corpus we are
not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the
petitioners. We consider here only the lawful power
of the commission to try the petitioner for the offense
charged. In the present cases it must be recognized
throughout that the military tribunals which Congress has sanctioned by the Articles of War are not
courts

whose

to review

by

rulings

and judgments are made subject

this Court.

See

Ex

parte

Vallandigham,

Wall. 243; In re Vidal, 179 U. S. 126; cf. Ex parte
Quirin, supra, 39. They are tribunals whose deter1

minations are reviewable by the military authorities

provided in the military orders constituting such tribunals or as provided by the Articles
either

as
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Congress conferred on the courts no power
to review their determinations save only as it has
granted judicial power "to grant writs of habeas
corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause
28 U. S. C. §§ 451, 452.
of restraint of liberty."
of

War.

The

may

courts

inquire whether the detention

com-

within the authority of those detaining
the petitioner. If the military tribunals have lawful
authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action

plained of

is

not subject to judicial review merely because they
have made a wrong decision on disputed facts.
is

Correction of their errors of decision is not for the
courts but for the military authorities which are
alone

authorized

to

review

their

See
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 81; Runkle v. United
States, 122 U. S. 543, 555-556; Carter v. McClaughry,
decisions.

183 U. S. 365; Collins v. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416.

Moran, 203 U.

Cf. Matter of

Finally,
as

of

we

held in

Ex

S. 96, 105.

parte Quirin, supra, 24, 25,

we hold now, that Congress by sanctioning trials
enemy aliens by military commission for offenses

against the law of

war had recognized the

make

accused to

a defense.

right of the

Cf Ex parte Kawato,
.

317 U. S. 69. It has not foreclosed their right to
contend that the Constitution or laws of the United
States withhold authority to proceed with the trial.
It has not withdrawn, and the Executive branch of
the

Government could

not, unless there

was

sus-

pension of the writ, withdraw from the courts the
duty and power to make such inquiry into the authority of the commission as

may

be made by habeas

corpus.

With

these governing principles in

mind we turn

to the consideration of the several contentions urged
to establish

want

of authority in the commission.

We are not here concerned with the power of military

—

777534

48

22
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commissions to try

4 Wall.

Ex

2,

civilians.

is

Ex

parte Milligan,

132; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378;

parte Quirin, supra, 45.

tention

See

The Government's

con-

that General Styer's order creating the

commission conferred authority on

only to try the
purported charge of violation of the law of war committed by petitioner, an enemy belligerent, while in

command
territory

it

army occupying United States
during time of war. Our first inquiry must
of a

hostile

therefore be whether the present commission

created

by lawful

military

command

and,

if

was
so,

whether authority could thus be conferred on the
commission to place petitioner on trial after the
cessation of hostilities between the armed forces of
the United States and Japan.
The authority to create the commission. General
Styer's order for the appointment of the commission
was made by him as Commander of the United States
Army Forces, Western Pacific. His command in-

—

cludes, as part of a vastly greater area, the Philippine

Islands,

where the alleged offenses were committed,

where petitioner surrendered as a prisoner of war,
and where, at the time of the order convening the
commission, he was detained as a prisoner in custody
of the United States Army.
The congressional recognition of military commissions and its sanction
of their use in trying offenses against the law of

war

we have referred, sanctioned their creation
by military command in conformity to long-estabto which

American precedents. Such a commission
may be appointed by any field commander, or by any
commander competent to appoint a general courtmartial, as was General Styer, who had been vested
with that power by order of the President. 2 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, 2d ed., *1302;
lished

cf. Article of

War

8.

Here the commission was not only created by a

333

commander competent

to appoint

it,

but

his order

conformed to the established policy of the Government and to higher military commands authorizing
In a proclamation of July 2, 1942 (56
his action.
Stat.

1964), the President proclaimed that

enemy

who

during time of war, enter the
United States, or any territory or possession thereof,
and who violate the law of war, should be subject to
belligerents

the law of

war and

tribunals.

Paragraph 10 of the Declaration of Pots-

dam

of July 26,

to the jurisdiction of military

1945,

declared that

".

.

.

stern

meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our
prisoners."
U. S. Dept. of State Bull., Vol. XIII,
No. 318, pp. 137-138. This Declaration was accepted by the Japanese government by its note of
August 10, 1945. U. S. Dept. of State Bull., Vol.
XIII, No. 320, p. 205.

justice shall be

By

direction of the President, the Joint Chiefs of

American Military Forces, on September
1945, instructed General MacArthur, Commander
Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, to

Staff of the
12,

in

proceed with the trial, before appropriate military
tribunals, of such Japanese war criminals "as have
been or may be apprehended." By order of General
MacArthur of September 24, 1945, General Styer
was specifically directed to proceed with the trial of
petitioner upon the charge here involved.
This
order was accompanied by detailed rules and regula-

which General MacArthur prescribed for the
trial of war criminals.
These regulations directed,
among other things, that review of the sentence imposed by the commission should be by the officer
convening it, with "authority to approve, mitigate,
remit, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter
the sentence imposed," and directed that no sentence
of death should be carried into effect until confirmed
tions
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by

the

Commander

in Chief,

United States

Army

Forces, Pacific.
It thus appears that the order creating the

sion for the trial of petitioner

command, and was

commis-

was authorized by

complete conformity
to the Act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such
tribunals for the trial of offenses against the law of
war committed by enemy combatants. And we turn
to the question whether the authority to create the
commission and direct the trial by military order
continued after the cessation of hostilities.
An important incident to the conduct of war is the
adoption of measures by the military commander,
not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize
and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies
who, in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort, have violated the law of war. Ex parte
military

in

The trial and punishment of
enemy combatants who have committed violations
Quirin,

supra,

of the law of
of

28.

war is thus not only

war operating

a part of the conduct

as a preventive

measure against

such violations, but is an exercise of the authority
sanctioned by Congress to administer the system of
military justice recognized by the law of war. That
sanction is without qualification as to the exercise of
from
this authority so long as a state of war exists
its declaration until peace is proclaimed.
See United
States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 70; The Protector,
12 Wall. 700, 702; McElrath v. United States, 102
U. S. 426, 438; Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 9-10.

—

The war power, from which

the commission derives

not limited to victories in the field,
but carries with it the inherent power to guard against
the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy,
at least in ways Congress has recognized, the evils
which the military operations have produced. See
its

existence,

is

Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 507.
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We

cannot say that there is no authority to convene a commission after hostilities have ended to try
violations of the law of war committed before their
cessation, at least until peace has been officially
recognized by treaty or proclamation of the political
branch of the Government. In fact, in most instances the practical administration of the system
of military justice under the law of war would fail
if such authority were thought to end with the cessaFor only after their cessation
tion of hostilities.
could the greater

number

of offenders

and the

pal ones be apprehended and subjected to

No

princi-

trial.

writer on international law appears to have

regarded the power of military tribunals, otherwise
competent to try violations of the law of war, as

terminating before the formal state of war has ended. 1

In our own military history there have been numerous
instances in which offenders were tried by military
commission after the cessation of hostilities and before
the proclamation of peace, for offenses against the
law of war committed before the cessation of hostilities.

The

2

extent to which the power to prosecute viola-

tions of the law of

declared rests,

is
1

The Commission on

war

be exercised before peace
nor with the courts, but with the
shall

the Responsibility of the Authors of the

War and on

the Enforcement of Penalties of the Versailles Peace Conference, which met
after cessation of hostilities in the First
lators of the

World War, were

of the view that vio-

law of war could be tried by military tribunals.

Commission, March

9, 1919,

14

Am.

J. Int. L. 95, 121.

See Report of the

See also

memorandum

American commissioners concurring on this point, id., at p. 141. The treaties
of peace concluded after World War I recognized the right of the Allies and of
the United States to try such offenders before military tribunals. See Art.
228 of Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919; Art. 173 of Treaty of St. Germain,
Sept. 10, 1919; Art. 157 of Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920.
The terms of the agreement which ended hostilities in the Boer War reserved
the right to try, before military tribunals, enemy combatants who had violated
the law of war. 95 British and Foreign State Papers (1901-1902) 160. See
also trials cited in Colby, War Crimes, 23 Michigan Law Rev. 482, 496-7.
2 See cases mentioned
in Ex parte Quirin, supra, p. 32, note 10, and in 2
*1310-1311,
Winthrop, supra,
n. 5; 14 Op. A. G. 249 (Modoc Indian Prisoners).
of
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branch of the Government, and may itself
by governed by the terms of an armistice or the
treaty of peace. Here, peace has not been agreed
upon or proclaimed. Japan, by her acceptance of
the Potsdam declaration and her surrender, has
political

acquiesced in the

trials of

of the law of war.

those guilty of violations

The conduct

by the
military commission has been authorized by the
political branch of the Government, by military
command, by international law and usage, and by
of the trial

the terms of the surrender of the Japanese govern-

ment.
The charge.

—Neither congressional action nor the

military orders constituting the commission authorized

to place petitioner

it

preferred against

war.

The

him

is

on

trial

unless the charge

of a violation of the law of

charge, so far as

between October

now

relevant,

is

that

1944 and September
2, 1945, in the Philippine Islands, "while commander
of armed forces of Japan at war with the United
States of America and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander
petitioner,

to control

9,

members
commit brutal

the operations of the

command, permitting them

to

of his
atroci-

and other high crimes against people of the
United States and of its allies and dependencies,
particularly the Philippines; and he * * * thereties

by

violated the laws of war."

Bills

of particulars, filed

by the prosecution by

order of the commission, allege a series of acts, one

hundred and twenty-three in number, committed by
members of the forces under petitioner's command
during the period mentioned. The first item specifies
the execution of "a deliberate plan and purpose to
massacre and exterminate a large part of the civilian
population of Batangas Province, and to devastate
and destroy public, private and religious property
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therein, as a result of

women and

which more than 25,000 men,

children,

all

unarmed noncombatant

were brutally mistreated and killed, without cause or trial, and entire settlements were devastated and destroyed wantonly and without military
Other items specify acts of violence,
necessity."
cruelty and homicide inflicted upon the civilian population and prisoners of war, acts of wholesale pillage
and the wanton destruction of religious monuments.
civilians,

not denied that such acts directed against the
civilian population of an occupied country and
against prisoners of war are recognized in internaArticles
tional law as violations of the law of war.
4, 28, 46, and 47, Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2296, 2303, 2306-7.
It

But

is

urged that the charge does not allege that
petitioner has either committed or directed the commission of such acts, and consequently that no violation is charged as against him.
But this overlooks
the fact that the gist of the charge is an unlawful
breach of duty by petitioner as an army commander
it is

members of his command by "permitting them to commit" the extensive and widespread atrocities specified.
The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an
army commander a duty to take such appropriate
measures as are within his power to control the
to control the operations of the

command

troops under his
specified acts

which are violations of the law of war

and which are

likely to

hostile territory

whether he

for the prevention of the

attend the occupation of

by an uncontrolled

soldiery,

and

may

sibility for his

be charged with personal responfailure to take such measures when

violations result.

That

this

was the

precise issue to

be tried was made clear by the statement of the prosecution at the opening of the trial.
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It

evident that the conduct of military opera-

is

tions

by troops whose

excesses are unrestrained

the orders or efforts of their

commander would almost

certainly result in violations which
of the law of

war

to prevent.

civilian populations

by

Its

it is

the purpose

purpose to protect

and prisoners of war from bru-

would largely be defeated if the commander
of an invading army could with impunity neglect to
take reasonable measures for their protection. Hence
the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be
tality

avoided through the control of the operations of war

by commanders who

are to

some extent responsible

for their subordinates.

by the Annex

Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, respecting the laws and
customs of war on land. Article 1 lays down as a
condition which an armed force must fulfill in order
to be accorded the rights of lawful belligerents, that
it must be "commanded by a person responsible for
This

is

recognized

to the

36 Stat. 2295. Similarly Article
19 of the Tenth Hague Convention, relating to bombardment by naval vessels, provides that commanders
his subordinates."

in chief of the belligerent vessels

"must

see that the

above Articles are properly carried out."
2389.

And

Article 26 of the

36 Stat.

Geneva Red Cross Con-

vention of 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 2092, for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in

armies in the field, makes it "the duty of the commanders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to provide
for the details of execution of the foregoing articles,
[of

*

the convention] as well as for unforeseen cases
*" And, finally, Article 43 of the Annex of
*

Hague Convention, 36 Stat. 2306, requires
commander of a force occupying enemy terri-

the Fourth

that the

was petitioner, "shall take all the measures
in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless
tory, as
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laws

the

prevented,

absolutely

force

in

in

the

country."

These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner,
who at the time specified was military governor of
the Philippines, as well as commander of the Japanese
forces, an affirmative duty to take such measures as
were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population. This duty of a commanding officer
has heretofore been recognized, and its breach penalized

by our own

military tribunals. 3

A

like principle

has been applied so as to impose liability on the

United States in international arbitrations. Case of
Jeannaud, 3 Moore, International Arbitrations, 3000;
Case of "The Zafiro", 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 707.

We

do not make the laws of war but we respect
them so far as they do not conflict with the commands
There is no conof Congress or the Constitution.
tention that the present charge, thus read, is without
the support of evidence, or that the commission held
petitioner responsible for failing to take measures
which were beyond his control or inappropriate for

commanding

a

officer to

take in the circumstances. 4

Failure of an officer to take measures to prevent murder of an inhabitant of
an occupied country committed in his presence. Gen. Orders No. 221, Hq.
Div. of the Philippines, August 17, 1901. And in Gen. Orders No. 264, Hq.
*

Div. of the Philippines, September

9, 1901, it

was held that an

be found guilty for failure to prevent a murder unless
accused had "the power to prevent"
4

In

it

officer

could not

appeared that the

it.

findings the commission took account of the difficulties "faced

its

by

the Accused with respect not only to the swift and overpowering advance of

American
ization,

forces,

but also to the errors of

equipment, supply

.

.

.,

his predecessors,

training,

weaknesses in organ-

communication, discipline and the

and the "tactical situation, the character, training and
capacity of staff officers and subordinate commanders as well as the traits of
character ... of his troops." It nonetheless found that petitioner had not
taken such measures to control his troops as were "required by the circummorale of

stances."

his troops,"

We

do not weigh the evidence.

sufficiently states a violation against the

upon the

We

merely hold that the charge

law of war, and that the commission,

facts found, could properly find petitioner guilty of such a violation.
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We

do not here appraise the evidence on which petitioner was convicted.
We do not consider what
measures, if any, petitioner took to prevent the commission, by the troops under his command, of the
plain violations of the law of war detailed in the bill
of particulars, or whether such measures as he may
have taken were appropriate and sufficient to discharge the duty imposed upon him. These are questions within the peculiar competence of the military
officers composing the commission and were for it to
decide.
See Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 178.
It is plain that the charge on which petitioner was
tried charged him with a breach of his duty to control

members of his command, by
commit the specified atrocities.

the operations of the

permitting them to

This was enough to require the commission to hear
evidence tending to establish the culpable failure of
petitioner to perform the duty imposed on him by
the law of war and to pass upon its sufficiency to
establish guilt.

Obviously charges of violations of the law of war
triable before a military tribunal need not be stated
with the precision of a common law indictment.
Cf. Collins v.

But we conthe charge, tested by

McDonald, supra, 420.

clude that the allegations of

any reasonable standard, adequately allege a violation of the law of war and that the commission had
authority to try and decide the issue which it raised.
Cf. Dealy v. United States, 152

U.

S.

539; Williamson

United States, 207 U. S. 425, 447; Glasser v.
United States, 315 U. S. 60, 66, and cases cited.
The proceedings before the commission. The regulations prescribed by General MacArthur governing

v.

—

the procedure for the

trial of petitioner

by the com-

mission directed that the commission should admit

such evidence "as in
in

its

opinion would be of assistance

proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the
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commission's opinion would have probative value in
the mind of a reasonable man," and that in particular
might admit affidavits, depositions or other
it
statements taken by

by

officers detailed for

The

military authority.

that purpose

petitions in this case

charged that in the course of the trial the commission
received, over objection by petitioner's counsel, the
deposition of a witness taken pursuant to military
It
authority by a United States Army captain.
also, over like objection, admitted hearsay and
opinion evidence tendered by the prosecution. Petitioner argues, as ground for the writ of habeas
corpus, that Article 25

5

of the Articles of

War

pro-

by the commission

hibited the reception in evidence

on behalf of the prosecution in a
capital case, and that Article 38 6 prohibited the
reception of hearsay and of opinion evidence.
of depositions

We

think that neither Article 25 nor Article 38

applicable to the trial of an

enemy combatant by

is

a

military commission for violations of the law of war.

War

Article 2 of the Articles of

sons

*

*

*

enumerates "the per-

who

subject to these articles,"

are

denominated, for purposes of the Articles, as "persons subject to military law."
In general, the
persons so enumerated are members of our own

Army and of the personnel accompanying the Army.
Enemy combatants are not included among them.
Articles 12, 13
6

and

Article 25 provides:

"A

14, before the

adoption of Article

duly authenticated deposition taken upon reason-

able notice to the opposite party

may

be read in evidence before any military

court or commission in any case not capital, or in any proceeding before a
court of inquiry or a military board,

may

be adduced for the defense

.

.

.

Provided,

That testimony by deposition

in capital cases."

•Article 38 provides: "The President may, by regulations, which he may
modify from time to time, prescribe the procedure, including modes of proof,
in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and
other military tribunals, which regulations shall insofar as he shall deem practicable, apply the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal
cases in the district courts of the United States: Provided,

That nothing con-

trary to or inconsistent with these articles shall be so prescribed:

.

.

."
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15 in 1916,

made

"persons subject to military

all

law" amenable to

by courts-martial for any
offense made punishable by the Articles of War.
Article 12 makes triable by general court-martial
"any other person who by the law of war is subject
to trial by military tribunals."
Since Article 2, in
its 1916 form, includes some persons who, by the law
of war, were, prior to 1916, triable by military commission, it was feared by the proponents of the 1916
trial

legislation that in the absence of a saving provision,

by

and 14 to try
such persons before courts-martial might be construed to deprive the non-statutory military commission of a portion of what was considered to be its
traditional jurisdiction.
To avoid this, and to
preserve that jurisdiction intact, Article IS was
added to the Articles. 7 It declared that "The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving
the authority given

*

military commissions
diction

respect

in

Articles 12, 13

of

by the law

of

*

*

of concurrent juris-

or

offenders

war may be

that

offenses
triable

by such

military commissions."

By

thus recognizing military commissions in order

to preserve their traditional jurisdiction over

enemy

combatants unimpaired by the Articles, Congress
gave sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quirin, to any
7

General Crowder, the Judge Advocate General, who appeared before

Congress as sponsor for the adoption of Article 15 and the accompanying

amendment

of Article 25, in explaining the purpose of Article 15, said:

"Article 15
a

number

is

military commission
ence, though

them

in

We

new.

of persons

it is

who
is

have included

by

our common-law war court.

recognized by statute law.

military commission.

law

A

no statutory existAs long as the articles embraced
It has

the designation 'persons subject to military law,' and provided that

they might be tried by court-martial,
provision for their

trial

courts; so this

Cong., 1st Sess.,

new

p. 40.)

I

was

by court-martial,

that the provision operated to exclude

war

in article 2 as subject to military

are also subject to trial

article

afraid that, having

made

a special

and 14] it might be held
by military commission and other

[Arts. 12, 13

trials

was introduced:

.

.

."

(Sen. R.

130, 64th.
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use of the military commission contemplated by the
common law of war. But it did not thereby make
subject to the Articles of

those defined

by

War

persons other than

Article 2 as being subject to the

Articles, nor did it confer the benefits of the Articles

upon such

persons.

The

Articles

recognized but

one kind of military commission, not two. But they
sanctioned the use of that one for the trial of two
classes of persons, to one of which the Articles do,
and to the other of which they do not, apply in such
trials.
Being of this latter class, petitioner cannot
claim the benefits of the Articles, which are applicable only to the members of the other class.
Petitioner, an enemy combatant, is therefore not a person

made

subject to the Articles of

War by Article

2,

and the military commission before which he was
tried, though sanctioned, and its jurisdiction saved,
by Article IS, was not convened by virtue of the
Articles of War, but pursuant to the common law of
war. It follows that the Articles of War, including
Articles 25 and 38, were not applicable to petitioner's trial and imposed no restrictions upon the
procedure to be followed. The Articles left the
control over the procedure in such a case where it
had previously been, with the military command.
Petitioner further urges that

by

virtue of Article

63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, 47 Stat. 2052,
he is entitled to the benefits afforded by the 25th

and 38th Articles of

War

to

members

of our

own

"Sentence may be
pronounced against a prisoner of war only by the
same courts and according to the same procedure as
in the case of persons belonging to the armed forces
of the detaining Power."
Since petitioner is a prisoner of war, and as the 25th and 38th Articles of
War apply to the trial of any person in our own armed
forces, it is said that Article 63 requires them to be

forces.

Article

63

provides:
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applied in the

trial

But we think
setting in the Con-

of petitioner.

examination of Article 63 in its
vention plainly shows that it refers to sentence "pronounced against a prisoner of war" for an offense
committed while a prisoner of war, and not for a
violation of the law of war committed while a
combatant.
Article 63 of the Convention appears in part 3,
entitled "Judicial Suits," of Chapter 3, "Penalties
Applicable to Prisoners of War," of § V, "Prisoners'
Relations with the Authorities," one of the sections
All taken together relate
of Title III, "Captivity."
only to the conduct and control of prisoners of war
while in captivity as such. Chapter 1 of § V, Article
42 deals with complaints of prisoners of war because of the conditions of captivity. Chapter 2,
Articles 43 and 44, relates to those of their number
chosen by prisoners of war to represent them.
Chapter 3 of § V, Articles 45 through 67, is entitled "Penalties Applicable to Prisoners of War."
Part 1 of that chapter, Articles 45 through 53, indicate what acts of prisoners of war, committed while
prisoners, shall be considered offenses, and defines to

some extent the punishment which the detaining
power may impose on account of such offenses. 8
8

Part

1

of

Chapter

3,

"General Provisions," provides

in Articles

45 and 46

that prisoners of war are subject to the regulations in force in the armies of

punishments other than those provided "for the
may not be imposed on prisoners
of war, and that "Collective punishment for individual acts" is forbidden.
Article 47 provides that "Acts constituting an offense against discipline, and
the detaining power, that

same

acts for soldiers of the national armies"

particularly attempted escape, shall be verified immediately; for

all

prisoners

of war, commissioned or not, preventive arrest shall be reduced to the absolute

minimum.

Judicial

as rapidly as

proceedings against prisoners of war shall be conducted
* *
*
In all cases, the duration

the circumstances permit

imprisonment shall be deducted from the disciplinary or
*"
*
*
punishment
inflicted
judicial
Article 48 provides that prisoners of war, after having suffered "the judicial
or disciplinary punishment which has been imposed on them" are not to be
treated differently from other prisoners, but provides that "prisoners punished
of

preventive

as a result of attempted

escape

may

be subjected

to special surveillance."
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Punishment

is

of

two kinds

"judicial/' the latter being the

— "disciplinary"
more

and

Article

severe.

52 requires that leniency be exercised in deciding
whether an offense requires disciplinary or judicial
punishment, Part 2 of Chapter 3 is entitled "Disciplinary Punishments," and further defines the
extent of such punishment, and the mode in which it
may be imposed. Part 3, entitled "Judicial Suits,"
in which Article 63 is found, describes the procedure
by which "judicial" punishment may be imposed.
The three parts of Chapter 3, taken together, are
thus a comprehensive description of the substantive
offenses which prisoners of war may commit during
their imprisonment, of the penalties which may be
imposed on account of such offenses, and of the
procedure by which guilt may be adjudged and
sentence pronounced.
We think it clear, from the context of these
recited provisions, that part 3, and Article 63 which
it contains, apply only to judicial proceedings directed
against a prisoner of

war

while a prisoner of war.

committed
gives no indica-

for offenses

Section

V

was designed to deal with offenses
other than those referred to in parts 1 and 2 of
Chapter 3.
tion that this part

We

cannot say that the commission, in admitting
evidence to which objection is now made, violated

any act

of Congress, treaty or military

Article 49 recites

command

that prisoners "given disciplinary punishment

may

not be

and 51 deal
with escaped prisoners who have been retaken or prisoners who have attempted
to escape. Article 52 provides: "Belligerents shall see that the competent
authorities exercise the greatest leniency in deciding the question of whether an
infraction committed by a prisoner of war should be punished by disciplinary
deprived of the prerogatives attached to their rank."

or judicial measures.

Articles 50

This shall be the case especially when

of deciding on acts in connection with escape or attempted

A

prisoner

may

it is

escape

a question

*

*

*

not be punished more than once because of the same act or

the same count."

,
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defining the commission's authority.

already stated

we

For reasons

hold that the commission's rulings

on evidence and on the mode of conducting these
proceedings against petitioner are not reviewable by
the courts, but only by the reviewing military au-

From

thorities.

this

viewpoint

it is

unnecessary to

consider what, in other situations, the Fifth

ment might

Amend-

and as to that no intimation
one way or the other is to be implied. Nothing we
have said is to be taken as indicating any opinion
on the question of the wisdom of considering such
evidence, or whether the action of a military tribunal
in admitting evidence, which Congress or controlling
military

require,

command

may

has directed to be excluded,

be drawn in question by petition for habeas corpus
or prohibition.
Effect of failure to give notice of the trial to the protecting power.

—Article 60 of the Geneva Convention

of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2051, to which the United

States and

Japan were

signatories, provides that

"At

the opening of a judicial proceeding directed against

Power shall advise
the protecting Power thereof as

a prisoner of war, the detaining

the representative of

soon as possible, and always before the date set for
the opening of the trial." Petitioner relies on the
failure to give the prescribed notice to the protecting

power

9

to establish

want

of authority in the

mission to proceed with the

com-

trial.

For reasons already stated we conclude that Article 60 of the Geneva Convention, which appears in
part 3, Chapter 3, § V, Title III of the Geneva Convention, applies only to persons
9

U.

S.

are subjected

was the power designated by Japan
war detained by the United States
Dept. of State Bull., Vol. XIII, No. 317, p. 125.

Switzerland, at the time of the

trial,

for the protection of Japanese prisoners of

except in Hawaii.

who
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to judicial proceedings for offenses committed while
prisoners of war. 10
10

One

of the items of the

bill

of particulars, in support of the charge against

members of the armed forces under his
and execute three named and other prisoners of war, "subject-

petitioner, specifies that he permitted

command

to try

ing to trial without prior notice to a representative of the protecting power,

without opportunity to defend, and without counsel; denying opportunity to
appeal from the sentence rendered; failing to notify the protecting power of
the sentence pronounced; and executing a death sentence without

communi-

cating to the representative of the protecting power the nature and circumstances of the offense charged."
inapplicable to petitioner

it is

It

might be suggested that

if

Article 60

is

inapplicable in the cases specified, and that hence

he could not be lawfully held or convicted on a charge of failing to require the
notice, provided for in Article 60, to be given.

As the Government

insists, it

does not appear from the charge and specifica-

tions that the prisoners in question

were not charged with offenses committed

by them as prisoners rather than with offenses against the law of war committed by them as enemy combatants. But apart from this consideration,
independently of the notice requirements of the Geneva Convention, it is a
violation of the law of war, on which there could be a conviction

if

supported

by evidence, to inflict capital punishment on prisoners of war without affording
them opportunity to make a defense. 2 Winthrop, supra, *434—435, 1241;
Article 84, Oxford Manual, Laws and Customs of War on Land; U. S. War
Dept., Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare (1940) par. 356; Lieber's
Code, G. O. No. 100 (1863) Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
to

United States

in the Field, par. 12; Spaight,

Further, the commission, in making
charges, on which

the others

if

acted, in three classes,

it

War

Rights on Land, 462,

summarized

findings,

its

any one

n.

as follows the

of which, independently of

supported by evidence, would be sufficient to support the convic-

tion: (1) execution or massacre without trial

and maladministration generally

of civilian internees and prisoners of war; (2) brutalities committed upon the
civilian population,

and

necessity, of a large

(3)

burning and demolition, without adequate military

number

of homes, places of business, places of religious

worship, hospitals, public buildings and educational institutions.

The commission concluded:

command

That
members

"(1)

crimes have been committed by

a series of atrocities and other high

of petitioner "against people of
*

dependencies

*

armed forces" under
the United States, their allies and

of the Japanese

that they were not sporadic in nature but in

*;

cases were methodically supervised

by Japanese

officers

many

and noncommissioned

officers"; (2) that during the period in question petitioner "failed to provide

ful

*

was required by the circumstances."
where murder and rape and vicious, revengeactions are widespread offenses, and there is no effective attempt by a com-

effective control of

The commission
mander

said:

to discover

*

"*

*

[his]

*

troops, as

*

and control the criminal

acts,

such a commander

may

be

held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops, de-

pending upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding them."
The commission made no finding of non-compliance with the Geneva Convention.

Nothing has been brought

—

777534

48

23

to our attention

from which we could
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It thus appears that the order

convening the commission was a lawful order, that the commission was
lawfully constituted, that petitioner was charged
with violation of the law of war, and that the commission had authority to proceed with the trial, and
in doing so did not violate any military, statutory,
or constitutional command. We have considered,
but find it unnecessary to discuss, other contentions
which we find to be without merit. We therefore
conclude that the detention of petitioner for trial and
his

detention upon his conviction, subject to the

prescribed review

by the military

authorities,

were

and that the petition for certiorari, and leave
to file in this Court petitions for writs of habeas
corpus and prohibition should be, and they are
lawful,

Denied.

Mr. Justice Jackson took no

part in the con-

sideration or decision of these cases.

[Dissenting opinions

Mr.

by Mr.

Justice

Murphy and

Justice Rutledge are not reproduced.]

conclude that the alleged non-compliance with Article 60 of the Geneva Convention had any relation to the commission's finding of a series of atrocities

committed by members

of the forces

under petitioner's command, and that he

failed to provide effective control of his troops, as

was required by the circum-

stances; or which could support the petitions for habeas corpus on the ground

that petitioner had been charged with or convicted for failure to require the
notice prescribed by Article 60 to be given.

